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Despite	   what	   was	   suggested	   (to	   me	   at	   least)	   by	   the	   title	   of	   this	   book,	  Metaphysics	   and	  
Science	   is	   not	   a	   set	   of	   essays	   reflecting	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   metaphysics	   and	  
science.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  set	  of	  essays	  on	  specific	  topics	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  science,	  selected	  
on	   the	  basis	  of	  Mumford	  and	  Tugby’s	  proposed	  definition	  of	  what	   the	   latter	   is.	  Given	   the	  
famed	   resistance	   of	   either	   metaphysics	   or	   science	   to	   definition	   individually	   it	   is	   certainly	  
ambitious	  of	  the	  editors	  to	  try	  to	  define,	  in	  a	  brief	  introduction,	  the	  ‘metaphysics	  of	  science’,	  
and	   I	  myself	   think	   that	   their	   attempt	   at	   demarcation	   fails.	   	   	   Partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this,	   and	  
while	   many	   of	   the	   essays	   are	   individually	   rewarding,	   I	   was	   not	   fully	   convinced	   that	   they	  
should	   have	   been	   gathered	   together	   instead	   of	   left	   to	   suffer	   a	   more	   scattered	   existence	  
among	  the	  various	  journals.	  Since	  it	   is	  Mumford	  and	  Tugby’s	  definition	  that	   is	  supposed	  to	  
give	  shape	  to	  the	  book,	  my	  critical	  focus	  will	  initially	  be	  on	  it.	  	  From	  there,	  I	  shall	  summarize	  
the	  four	  main	  sections	  of	  the	  volume	  before	  closing	  with	  a	  few	  remarks	  on	  the	  whole.	  
Mumford	  and	  Tugby’s	  conception	  of	   the	  metaphysics	  of	  science,	  and	   thus	  their	  vision	  
for	   the	  volume,	   is	   guided	  by	   their	   insistence	   that	   if	   there	   is	  one	   thing	   that	  metaphysics	  of	  
science	   is	  not	   then	   it	   is	   theorizing	   about	   concepts	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   particular	   scientific	  
disciplines.	   	   Thus	   they	   say	   that	   in	   contrast	   to	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  engaged	   in	  debating	  
the	  viability	  of	  absolute	  space	  –	  a	  debate	  which	  concerns	  “specifically	  concepts	  developed	  
within	  the	  discipline	  of	  physics”	  –	  metaphysicians	  of	  science	  are	  concerned	  with	  “concepts	  
which	   are	   deployed	   in	  all	   the	   natural	   sciences,	   including	   the	   special	   sciences’’	   (p.	   6).	   This	  
emphasis	   on	   generality	   motivates	   their	   definition	   of	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   science	   as	   a	  
discipline	   concerned	  with	   (1)	  whatever	   it	   is	   “that	  make[s]	   scientific	   enquiry	   as	  we	  know	   it	  
possible”,	  and	  (2)	  the	  “metaphysical	  relationship	  between	  the	  various	  scientific	  disciplines”	  
(p.	  14).	  	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  first	  set	  of	  issues	  is,	  as	  they	  note,	  strongly	  Kantian	  in	  flavour,	  
and	   since	   they	   take	   it	   that	   science	   –	  whatever	   else	   it	  may	   be	   concerned	  with	   –	   is	   in	   the	  
business	   of	   furnishing	   predictions	   and	   explanations,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   metaphysics	   of	  
science	   concerns	   “those	   aspects	   of	   reality…	  which	   impose	   order	   on	   the	   world”;	   for	   “in	   a	  
	   2	  
chaotic,	  disorderly	  world,	   it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  kinds	  of	  predictions	  (not	  to	  
mention	   novel	   predictions)	   or	   construct	   the	   kinds	   of	   explanations	   that	   we	   find	   in	   natural	  
science”	   (pp.	   11-­‐12).	   	   Further,	   since	   it	   is	   the	   modal	   concepts	   of	   “kindhood,	   lawhood,	  
causation	   and	   causal	   power”	   that	   have	   this	   feature,	   it	   is	   the	   study	  of	   these	   concepts	   that	  
constitutes	  “the	  heart	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  science”	  (p.	  13).	  	  The	  motivation	  for	  the	  second	  
set	  of	  issues,	  those	  concerning	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  disciplines,	  is	  that	  “scientists	  tend	  
to	   specialize	   in	   their	   own	   branches	   of	   science…	   Even	   if	   scientists	   are	   interested	   in	   these	  
broader	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   branches	   of	   science	   relate…	   it	   is	   beyond	   their	   remit	   to	  
think	  about	  them”	  (p.	  14).	  	  In	  contrast,	  “as	  philosophers,	  metaphysicians	  of	  science	  are	  well	  
positioned	  to	  do	  this.”1	  	  	  	  	  	  
While	   I	   doubt	   there	   is	   a	   single	   philosopher	   of	   science	  who	  would	  deny	   that	  modality	  
and	   the	   relations	   between	   theories	   rank	   among	   its	   crucial	   questions,	   I	   myself	   found	   the	  
editors’	   rationale	   for	   restricting	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	   the	  metaphysics	  of	   science	   to	   these	  
questions	   somewhat	   unconvincing.	   	   	   I	   think,	   in	   fact,	   that	   we	   can	   take	   issue	   with	   their	  
justification	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  modality	  is	  necessarily	  central,	  the	  idea	  that	  metaphysicians	  of	  
science	   are	   well-­‐placed	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   inter-­‐theory	   relations	   in	   general,	   and	   even	   the	  
more	   foundational	   claim	   that	   scientific	  metaphysics	   should	   be	   aiming	   at	   generality	   in	   the	  
first	  place.	  
Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  study	  of	  modal	  concepts	  such	  as	  laws,	  dispositions	  and	  
causes,	   understood	   in	   sense	   sufficiently	   thick	   to	   “bring	   order	   to	   the	  world”,	   occupies	   the	  
centre	  ground	  in	  scientific	  metaphysics	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  these	  are	  needed	  for	  there	  to	  be	  
order	  and	  thus	  science	  at	  all.	  	  The	  criticism	  here	  is	  obvious,	  and	  it	  is	  that	  while	  they	  are	  right	  
that	  science	  –	  which	  is	  in	  some	  minimal	  sense	  just	  the	  study	  of	  regularities	  –	  trivially	  has	  as	  a	  
requirement	  the	  existence	  of	  regularity,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  anything	  needs	  to	  bring	  that	  
regularity	  about	   in	  order	  for	  regularity	  to	  exist.	   	  However,	  by	  their	  criterion	  world-­‐views	   in	  
which	  nothing	  does	  bring	  it	  about	  will	  trivially	  fail	  to	  qualify	  as	  scientific	  metaphysics.	  	  But	  of	  
course,	  a	  basic	  fault	  line	  in	  the	  discipline	  lies	  between	  Humeans	  and	  non-­‐Humeans,	  and	  thus	  
between	   positions	   that	   are	   opposed	   on	   precisely	   this	   issue;	   adopting	   a	   definition	   of	   the	  
metaphysics	  of	  science	  according	  to	  which	  what	  was	  one	  of	  its	  chief	  debates	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  
matter	  of	  dispute	  within	  metaphysics	  of	  science	  strikes	  me	  as	  an	  unsuccessful	  demarcation.2	  	  
Nor	  is	  it	  by	  any	  means	  the	  case	  that	  all	  those	  who	  deny	  that	  substantive	  modal	  notions	  are	  
necessary	   for	   science	   are	   simply	   unwilling	   to	   engage	   in	   metaphysics:	   there	   are	   after	   all	  
plenty	  of	   realist	  Humeans.	   	   It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  nothing	   fancier	  need	  be	  said	  to	   justify	   the	  
importance	  of	  laws	  in	  the	  discipline	  than	  that	  they	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  science,	  enigmatic,	  and	  
richly	   rewarding	   philosophically,	   but	   of	   course	   there	   is	   nothing	   in	   that	   justification	   that	  
prohibits	  non-­‐modal	  notions	  from	  being	  regarded	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  
As	  noted,	  however,	  Mumford	  and	  Tugby	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  science	  is	  
in	   the	  business	  of	  studying	  only	  modal	  concepts:	   its	  other	  strand	  of	  enquiry	  concerns	  “the	  
metaphysical	   relationships	   between	   the	   various	   scientific	   disciplines”.	   	   As	   noted	   also,	   the	  
motivation	  for	  this	  second	  strand	  differs	  from	  that	  for	  the	  first:	  it	  is	  after	  all	  far	  from	  obvious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  note	  that	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  (2007,	  section	  1.5)	  defend	  a	  similar	  claim	  concerning	  the	  proper	  role	  
of	  metaphysicians	  of	  science.	  
2	  There	  is	  also	  of	  course	  room	  for	  a	  position	  in	  which	  regularities	  are	  taken	  to	  need	  accounting	  for	  but	  
not	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  thick	  modal	  notions	  the	  editors	  cite;	  Wheeler’s	  speculation	  of	  ‘law	  without	  law’	  
is	  one	  such	  (Wheeler	  (1983)).	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that	  metaphysical	  relations	  between	  the	  different	  fields	  are	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  science	  to	  
exist,	   since	  the	   justification	   for	  categorizing	   them	  all	  as	   ‘sciences’	   typically	  appeals	   to	   their	  
shared	  methodologies	   instead	  of	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  metaphysics.	   	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  
reason	  offered	  for	  including	  this	  topic	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  metaphysicians	  of	  science,	  as	  
philosophers,	   are	   better	   placed	   to	   theorize	   about	   than	   scientists.	   	   But	   this	   is	   a	   puzzling	  
justification.	   One	   would	   hope	   that	   philosophers	   would	   fare	   better	   than	   scientists	   at	  
theorizing	   about	   pretty	   much	   any	   issue	   relating	   to	   science	   that	   we	   are	   apt	   to	   classify	   as	  
philosophical,	  so	  this	  justification	  presumably	  warrants	  the	  inclusion	  of	  much	  more	  than	  just	  
metaphysical	  relations	  between	  fields;	  further,	  since	  modal	  issues	  would	  clearly	  rank	  among	  
these	   issues,	   is	   there	   still	   any	   need	   to	   dust	   off	   our	   Kant?	   However,	   while	   if	   sound	   their	  
justification	  for	  including	  this	  topic	  would	  seem	  to	  justify	  many	  more,	  I	  myself	  am	  sceptical	  
that	  metaphysicians	  of	  science	  are	   in	  general	  more	  able	  than	  scientists	  to	  talk	  about	  these	  
relationships.	   It	   is	  after	  all	   said	   that	  Hilbert	  was	   the	   last	  mathematician	   to	  understand	   the	  
whole	  of	  mathematics;	   it	  seems	  rather	  ambitious	  to	  think	  that	  contemporary	  philosophers	  
can	   hope	   to	   be	   sufficiently	   proficient	   across	   all	   fields	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   relations	   between	  
them,	  at	  least	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  preoccupations	  of	  scientists.	  
This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  metaphysics	  of	  science	  should	  be	  aiming,	  definitionally,	  
at	  generality	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  To	  see	  my	  thinking	  here,	  let’s	  take	  it	  as	  read	  that	  the	  study	  of	  
scientific	  ontology	   is	  a	  central	  component	  of	  scientific	  metaphysics	  (regardless	  of	   its	  status	  
according	  to	  Mumford	  and	  Tugby’s	  criterion).	  	  Is	  it	  so	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  work	  to	  be	  done	  on	  
‘scientific	  ontology’	   in	  general	  –	  that	  is,	  work	  that	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  conjunction	  of	  work	  on	  
ontology	   in	   molecular	   biology,	   dynamic	   systems	   theory,	   social	   psychology,	   or	   quantum	  
physics	  –	  at	  least	  if	  it	  is	  to	  transcend	  insipid	  a	  priori	  debates	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  substance	  and	  
property?	  	  I	  myself	  do	  not	  think	  this	  is	  obvious.	  	  Indeed,	  John	  Worrall’s	  memorable	  remark	  
that	   the	  ether	  and	   the	  classical	  electromagnetic	   field	  are	  more	   like	  chalk	  and	  cheese	   than	  
chalk	   and	   cheese	   themselves	   should	   make	   us	   hesitant	   about	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   even	  
useful	  work	  of	  general	  scope	  to	  be	  done	  concerning	  ontology	   just	   in	  physics	   (and	  I	  haven’t	  
even	   mentioned	   anything	   quantum-­‐mechanical	   yet).3	   	   This	   general	   point	   may	   moreover	  
carry	  over	  to	  the	  volume’s	  central	  topic,	  namely	  laws	  and	  related	  topics.	   	  Consider	  the	  fact	  
that	   laws	   in	   quantum	   field	   theory	   are	   subject	   to	   such	   demanding	   logico-­‐mathematical	  
consistency	   constraints	   that	   one	   may	   argue	   they	   are	   necessary	   without	   invoking	   any	  
primitively	  modal	  notions.4	   	  As	  such,	   it	  seems	  one	  can	  claim	  that	  fundamental	  regimes	  can	  
tolerate	  a	  view	  at	  once	  Humean	  and	  necessitarian	  –	  suggesting	  in	  turn	  that	  that	  the	  modal	  
landscape	  can	  look	  very	  different	  between	  different	  scientific	  domains.	   	   Is	   it	  therefore	  safe	  
to	  assume	  that	   there	   is	   some	  general	  modal	  metaphysics	  of	   science	   that	  works	  across	   the	  
board,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  questions	  of	  interest	  to	  metaphysicians	  in	  general,	  each	  
needing	  different	  treatments	  in	  different	  contexts?	  	  	  
It	  will	  be	  clear,	  then,	  that	   I	  was	  not	  compelled	  by	  the	  justification	  for	  grouping	  papers	  
on	   these	  particular	   topics	   together	   in	   a	   volume	  purporting	   to	   represent	   ‘Metaphysics	   and	  
Science’.	  	  That	  said,	  the	  topics	  covered	  are	  indisputably	  major	  themes	  in	  the	  discipline,	  and	  
the	   poor	   framing	   of	   the	   concept	   behind	   the	   book	   needn’t	   compromise	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  
essays	   themselves	   –indeed	   several	   of	   them	  are	   very	   good.	   	   Let	  me	   therefore	  move	   away	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Worrall	  (1989),	  p.	  107-­‐8.	  	  	  
4	  I	  at	  least	  try	  to	  argue	  this	  in	  McKenzie	  (2014).	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from	  Mumford	  and	  Tugby’s	  own	  written	  contribution	  to	  focus	  now	  on	  the	  book’s	  four	  main	  
parts.	  
Part	  1	  of	  the	  book	  concerns	  laws,	  and	  contains	  papers	  by	  John	  Roberts,	  Jim	  Woodward	  
and	   Marc	   Lange.	   	   Roberts’	   paper	   makes	   the	   radical	   proposal	   that	   what	   explains	   the	  
counterfactual	  resilience	  of	   laws	   is	  the	  counterfactual	  resilience	  of	  measurement	  methods.	  	  
Woodward’s	  essay	   looks	  closely	  at	   the	  kind	  of	   reasoning	   scientists	  actually	  deploy	   to	   infer	  
laws	  and	  causal	  claims,	  arguing	  that	  that	  –	  despite	  its	  centrality	  to	  the	  Lewisian	  ‘best	  system’	  
analysis	   –	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   involves	   the	   weighing	   up	   of	   virtues	   such	   as	   simplicity	   and	  
strength	   is	   woefully	   inadequate.	   	   Rather,	   intervention	   and	   invariance	   principles	   are	  
deployed,	   and	   the	   modal	   content	   of	   these	   principles	   blocks	   any	   obvious	   route	   to	   modal	  
reduction.	   	   In	  the	  third	  contribution,	  Lange	  uses	  the	  framework	  developed	   in	  his	  Laws	  and	  
Lawmakers	  to	  articulate	  the	  claim,	  made	  by	  Einstein	  and	  many	  since,	  that	  Lorentz	  symmetry	  
constitutes	  a	   ‘constraint’	  on	   force	   laws	  –	  clearly	  an	   interesting	  project,	   since	  this	  necessity	  
allegedly	   stronger	   than	   nomic	   but	  weaker	   than	   logical	   is	   far	   from	   familiar.	  Of	   these	   three	  
essays,	  Woodward’s	   struck	  me	   as	   elegant	   and	   compelling,	   and	   the	   relevance	   of	   it	   to	   the	  
broader	   debate	   over	   laws	   was	   clear	   in	   spades.	   	   Lange’s	   paper	   also	   clearly	   engaged	   with	  
issues	  of	  interest	  to	  metaphysicians	  of	  physics	  and	  possibly	  also	  metaphysicians	  interested	  in	  
notions	   of	   grounding	   (though	  prior	   familiarity	  with	   Lange’s	   elegant	   but	   intricate	   system	   is	  
probably	  required	  to	  get	   to	  grips	  with	  the	  paper	   fully).	  Roberts’	  paper,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
was	  more	  of	  a	  struggle	  to	  connect	  up	  with	  the	  big	  issues	  in	  the	  debate,	  but	  that	  might	  reflect	  
more	  a	  lack	  of	  patience	  on	  my	  part	  than	  anything	  about	  his	  argument	  	  (I	  did	  find	  it	  rather	  a	  
dense	  read).	   	   I	   certainly	  can’t	   say	   that	   I	   figured	  out	  while	   I	  was	   reading	   it	  how	  to	  block	   its	  
radical-­‐looking	  conclusion,	  so	  no	  doubt	  there	  is	  something	  useful	  to	  be	  mined	  in	  there.	  	  	  	  
Section	  2	  of	  the	  book	  is	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  dispositions	  and	  causes.	  	  In	  the	  first	  of	  its	  two	  
chapters,	   Andreas	   Hüttemann	   gives	   an	   overview	   of	   his	   theory	   of	   causation	   based	   on	  
dispositions.	   	  Being,	   I	  take	   it,	  a	  condensed	  version	  of	  his	  book	  on	  the	  topic	  this	   is	  probably	  
the	  most	  panoramic	  essay	   in	   the	  volume.	   	  After	  arguing	   from	  considerations	  of	  composite	  
systems’	  behaviour	  that	  dispositions	  are	  needed	  in	  physics,	  he	  develops	  a	  theory	  according	  
to	  which	  causes	  are	  identified	  with	  that	  which	  diverts	  systems	  from	  their	  ‘default’	  evolution.	  
The	   resulting	  picture	  grants	   the	  notion	  of	   cause	   its	  distinctive	   interest-­‐relativity	  while	  also	  
letting	   it	   be	   something	   objective;	   it	   also	   allows	   for	   causes	   to	   be	   manifest	   in	   all	   domains	  
instead	   of	   being	   confined	   within	   physics.	   Though	   I	   got	   off	   the	   bus	   when	   he	   invoked	   the	  
‘essences	  of	   composite	   systems’	   in	  explaining	   the	  origins	  of	   causal	  modality,	   and	   though	   I	  
felt	   that	   something	   cried	   out	   to	   be	   said	   about	   how	   ‘vegetarian’	   the	   dispositions	   he	  
attributed	   to	   composite	   systems	   appeared	   to	   be	   (to	   my	   mind	   at	   least),	   I	   found	   that	   his	  
orientation	  of	   issues	   from	  Russell	  and	  Mackie	  within	  a	  dynamical	   framework	  an	  expansive	  
and	   stimulating	   read.	   	   His	   essay	   is	   followed	   by	   Jennifer	  McKitrick’s	  meditation	   on	  what	   it	  
takes	  to	  activate	  a	  power,	  where	  she	  holds	  that	  the	  need	  for	  powers	  to	  be	  activated	  if	  they	  
are	   to	   do	   any	  work	   plagues	   the	   dispositional	  monist	  with	   a	   nefarious	   regress.	   	  While	   she	  
references	   Hüttemann’s	   essay	   –	   making	   for	   a	   rare	   moment	   of	   cohesiveness	   within	   the	  
volume	   –	   her	   focus	   on	   such	   dispositions	   as	   fragility	   and	   flammability	   did	   rather	   seem	   to	  
extricate	  us	  from	  the	  scientific	  context	  Hüttemann	  set	  up	  and	  place	  us	  back	  in	  the	  ‘world	  as	  
pinball	  machine’	  that	  is	  the	  proclivity	  of	  analytic	  philosophers.	  Thus	  while	  McKitrick’s	  paper	  
is	   sustained	   and	  meticulous,	   and	   recommended	   for	   the	   dedicated	   student,	  my	   tastes	   are	  
such	  that	  I	  got	  rather	  less	  excited	  about	  it	  than	  the	  preceding	  piece.	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Section	   3	   of	   the	   book	   concerns	   natural	   kinds,	   and	   contains	   essays	   by	   Helen	   Beebee,	  
Emma	  Tobin,	  and	  L.A.	  Paul.	  	  Beebee’s	  essay	  argues	  against	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  
Kripke-­‐Putnam	   thesis	   that	   there	   are	   necessary	   a	   posteriori	   truths	   that	   strong	   essentialist	  
views	  about	  natural	  kinds	  are	  thereby	  justified:	  in	  particular,	  she	  denies	  that	  it	  follows	  that	  
natural	  kinds	  cannot	  ‘cross-­‐cut’	  or	  that	  they	  are	  incompatible	  with	  either	  Kuhnian	  relativism	  
or	  species	  pluralism.	   	  While	   I	  must	  say	  that	  she	  failed	  to	  convince	  me	  that	  anyone	  actually	  
holds	   that	   the	   cited	   strong	   essentialist	   views	   really	   follow	   from	   Kripke-­‐Putnam	   semantics	  
(since	  the	  quotations	  she	  provided	  in	  support	  of	  that	  view	  did	  not	  strike	  me	  as	  having	  those	  
implications),	  her	  paper	  brought	  some	  big	  themes	  into	  contact	  in	  a	  way	  that	  left	  me	  feeling	  
better	  oriented	  within	  the	  debate	  as	  a	  whole.	  Tobin’s	  essay	  concerns	  whether,	  in	  addition	  to	  
natural	   properties,	  we	   need	   a	   notion	   of	   natural	   kinds,	   and	   though	   I	   started	   out	   assuming	  
that	  the	  key	  question	  here	  was	  whether	  a	  primitive	  notion	  of	  property	  ‘grouping’	  is	  needed	  
in	  addition	  to	  that	  grouped,	  I	  fear	  that	  I	  actually	  felt	  less	  sure	  after	  18	  pages	  as	  to	  whether	  
that	  was	  right	  or	  wrong.	   	  Suffice	   to	  say	   that,	  although	   it	  brought	   interesting	  new	   issues	   to	  
the	   table,	   this	   chapter	  didn’t	   help	  me	   to	  order	   to	  my	   thoughts	  on	   the	   issue.	   	   Paul’s	   essay	  
took	  us	  back	  to	  Putnam,	  and	  here	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  block	  Putnam’s	  Paradox	  by	  
invoking	  natural	  kinds	  á	  la	  Lewis	  only	  works	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  world	  lacks	  kinds	  “which	  
would	  allow	  for	  permutations	  involving	  the	  predicates	  of	  current	  theory”	  (p.	  195).	  	  But	  while	  
the	  conclusion	  she	  draws	  from	  this	   is	   that	  scientific	  realism	  will	  only	  be	  well-­‐justified	   if	  we	  
“reject	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  world	  has	  deep	  or	  fundamental	  unbreakable	  symmetries”	  (ibid.)	  –	  
something	  that	  should	  seem	  very	  threatening	  given	  the	  importance	  of	  symmetry	  concepts	  in	  
fundamental	  physics	  –	   I	   couldn’t	  help	  but	   feel	   rather	  unmoved	  by	   the	  alleged	  catastrophe	  
that	  she	  visits	  upon	  us.	  	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  we	  have	  (in	  a	  sense)	  seen	  this	  play	  out	  in	  real	  life,	  
but	  both	  the	  reaction	  to	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  it	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  more	  different.	  	  
For	  example,	  the	  data	  on	  binding	  energies	  for	  isobaric	  nuclei	  (nuclei	  with	  the	  same	  number	  
of	   nucleons),	   together	  with	   the	  near-­‐equal	  masses	  of	   neutron	   and	  proton,	   suggested	   that	  
these	  two	  natural	  kinds	  were	  very	  much	  interchangeable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  nuclear	  
theory.	   	  However,	   rather	   than	   infer	   a	   disastrous	   referential	   failure,	  Heisenberg	  postulated	  
that	  as	  far	  as	  the	  nuclear	  interactions	  were	  concerned	  we	  were	  not	  dealing	  with	  two	  natural	  
kinds	   at	   all	   but	   rather	  one	   kind	   able	   to	   take	  on	   two	   states	   that	  were	  equivalent	   from	   the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  dynamics	  –	  a	  move	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  symmetries	  revolution	  in	  
particle	  physics	  and	  everything	   that	  has	  been	  entailed	  by	   that.	  Now,	   I	   am	  not	  here	   saying	  
that	   physical	   theories	   with	   significant	   symmetries	   cannot	   in	   principle	   be	   plagued	   by	  
referential	  problems.	  	  But	  what	  I	  am	  saying	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  issues	  here	  cannot	  even	  be	  
posed	   if	   we	   continue	   to	   imagine,	   as	   Paul	   and	   seemingly	   virtually	   everyone	   in	   this	   debate	  
does,	   that	   theories	   of	   physics	   are	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   predicate	   logic	   and	   not	   natural	  
mathematics.	  For	  me,	  the	  expressive	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  former	  in	  this	  case	  only	  underlines	  
that	  we	  often	  need	   to	  engage	  with	   the	   real	   languages	  of	   science	   to	  do	   real	  philosophy	  of	  
science.5	  	  	  
Part	   4	   is	   on	   emergence.	   	   Unlike	   the	   other	   sections,	   the	   topic	   here	   does	   not	   concern	  
“phenomena	  which	  bring	  order	  to	  the	  world”	  but	  rather	  (a	  specific	  concept	  relevant	  to)	  the	  
relations	  between	  the	  sciences.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  one	  paper	  in	  this	  section	  does	  rather	  stick	  out.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   For	   further	   discussion	   of	   how	   wedding	   debates	   about	   realism	   in	   physics	   to	   predicate	   logic	   can	  
obscure	  or	  distort	  the	  relevant	  issues,	  see	  Saunders	  and	  McKenzie	  (2014).	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Nevertheless,	   Jessica	   Wilson’s	   cross-­‐section	   of	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   work	   on	  
emergence,	  plus	  the	  defence	  of	  her	  own	  view,	  works	  as	  a	  stimulating	  stand-­‐alone	  piece	  (if	  
challenging	   at	   times	   in	   its	   presentation).	   	   In	   it,	  Wilson	   lays	   out	   her	   account	   of	   ontological	  
emergence,	   according	   to	   which	   a	   composite	   system	   can	   be	   claimed	   to	   be	   “ontologically	  
autonomous”	   from	   the	   composing	   entities	   on	   which	   it	   depends	   when	   the	   degrees	   of	  
freedom	  needed	  to	  characterize	   it	  are	  fewer	   in	  number	  than	  those	  needed	  to	  characterize	  
its	   components	  when	   relatively	   unconstrained:	   by	   Leibniz’s	   law,	   the	   former	  must	   then	   be	  
ontologically	  distinct	  from	  the	  latter	  and	  as	  such,	  she	  claims,	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  emergent	  
in	  a	  robust	  ontological	  sense	  (p.	  226).	  	  But	  while	  there	  is	  much	  to	  ruminate	  on	  in	  this	  essay,	  I	  
was	  a	  little	  unconvinced	  that	  mere	  distinctness	  according	  to	  Leibniz’s	  law	  was	  sufficient	  for	  
real	   “ontological	   autonomy”	   (one	   need	   only	   recall	   the	   dreaded	   statue-­‐lump	   cases	   to	  
generate	   that	   suspicion).	   	   Furthermore,	   I	   was	   unconvinced	   that	   all	   the	   examples	   of	  
“elimination”	   of	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   she	   provides	   really	   did	   involve	   elimination	   in	   an	  
ontological	   sense.	   	   She	   mentions,	   for	   example,	   how	   the	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   required	   to	  
characterize	   condensed	   matter	   systems	   at	   criticality	   are	   greatly	   reduced	   relative	   to	   the	  
number	  required	  to	  characterize	  their	  composing	  systems.	  	  But	  it	  strikes	  me	  that	  to	  say	  that	  
fewer	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  are	  “needed	  to	  characterize”	  a	  system	  is	  a	  different	  from	  saying	  
that	  they	  have	  been	  “eliminated”:	  indeed,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  in	  the	  condensed	  matter	  case	  
the	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  are	  still	  present	  but	  simply	  unimportant	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes.	  	  If	  
that	  is	  right,	  then	  her	  account	  may	  not	  after	  all	  be	  so	  different	  from	  the	  “straightforwardly	  
epistemological”	   (p.	  214)	  accounts	  she	  takes	  hers	   to	  be	  contrasted	  with.	   	   I	  note,	  however,	  
that	  not	  all	  of	  her	  examples	  suffered	  from	  this	  problem:	  in	  particular,	  the	  classical	  charged	  
sphere	  seemed	  to	  work	  much	  better	  for	  her	  purposes	  –	  something	  somewhat	  ironic,	  given	  
its	  relative	  mundanity	   in	  comparison	  with	  the	  systems	  typically	  discussed	   in	  the	  context	  of	  
emergence.6	  
With	   a	   roster	   of	   contributors	   like	   that	   Mumford	   and	   Tugby	   have	   assembled,	   there	  
couldn’t	  fail	  to	  be	  something	  worth	  taking	  away	  from	  this	  book.	  	  The	  quality	  of	  most	  of	  the	  
individual	   papers	   notwithstanding,	   however,	   the	   sections	   of	   the	   book	   are	   too	   slight	   to	   be	  
able	  to	  give	  representative	  outlines	  of	  the	  state	  of	  play	  in	  the	  relevant	  fields,	  and	  nor	  (by	  and	  
large)	  do	  the	  papers	  ‘talk’	  to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  really	  warrants	  having	  them	  gathered	  
together.	   	   I	   should	   say	   too	   that	   it	   is	   a	   little	   ragged	   round	   the	   edges	   with	   respect	   to	  
copyediting,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  errors	  were	  important	  (I	  could	  not,	  for	  example,	  make	  sense	  
of	   the	   equation	   on	   page	   206,	   and	   elsewhere	   the	  word	   ‘not’	   seemed	   to	   have	   disappeared	  
from	  a	  sentence	  or	  two).	  	  Thus	  if	  there	  is	  a	  paper	  in	  here	  on	  a	  topic	  that	  interests	  you,	  by	  all	  
means	   go	   ahead	  and	   read	   it;	   but	   I	  would	   shy	   away	   from	   saying	   that	   this	  was	   a	  book	   that	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Thanks	  to	  James	  Fraser	  for	  pointing	  out	  that	  these	  cases	  are	  arguably	  different.	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